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Small World of Inter-Firm Network and Firm’s Acquisition Behaviour – An Evidence 
from India 
Abstract 
Using a sample of listed firms in India, the study finds that the inter-firm network on account of 
director interlocks is a small world and the network has become more integrated since the 
introduction of corporate governance regulations in the country. Firm level analysis finds a 
negative relation between average path length and probability of acquiring indicating the 
importance of faster reach of information among the firms within the network. It also finds a 
non-linear relation given by inverted U-shaped curve between firm level clustering and 
probability of acquiring. Initially, increase in clustering has a positive effect through the 
informational quality effect; however at higher levels the negative informational redundancy 
effect dominates leading to a curvilinear relation. 
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Small World of Inter-Firm Network and Firm’s Acquisition Behaviour – An Evidence 
from India 
 
1. Introduction 
The resource dependence theory of board suggests that directors help organisations to manage 
external uncertainty and provide access to external information and other resources (Pfeffer, 
1972). The interlocked director provides the firm access to larger pool of resources on account of 
his affiliation with numerous firms. These interlocks are one of the mechanisms which facilitate 
formation of inter-firm network. Studies have found a positive relation between firm‟s centrality 
in network on account of director interlocks and its financial performance (Larcket et al., 2013; 
Balasubramanian et al., 2011).  However, the extent of clustering among firms in network also 
determines the flow of information within the network. The firm level centrality measures given 
by degree, betweenness and closeness measures (Freeman, 1979) do not account for clustering 
among neighbouring firms in the network. The small world literature explicitly accounts for 
effect of clustering in network. Small world is simply the notion that everyone is connected to 
everyone else in the world (Milgram, 1967). In mathematical terms, small world concept 
translates into a network characterised by small average path length and high clustering among 
nodes of the graph (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The small world effect is favourable for faster 
diffusion of information among nodes for large networks even if network density is low. These 
networks have few bridging ties also called the linchpins which enable transfer of information 
among different clusters. Potentially changes in small world property of a network can directly 
influence the flow of information. Empirical studies have established the small world nature of 
the co-authorship network (Newman, 2004; Moody, 2004; Goyal et al. 2006), network of 
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Broadway artists (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005), inter-firm network (Kogut and Walker, 2001; Davis et 
al., 2003), technology alliance network (Verspagen and Duysters, 2004) and network of 
investment banks syndicate (Baum et al., 2003). small world property affects outcomes. Few 
studies also analyse the effect of small world property of clustering on firm level outcomes like 
innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Schelling and Phelps, 2007; Fleming et. al. 2007), mergers and 
acquitisions (Davis et al., 2012) and lower firm value (Mendes-Da-Silva and Verges, 2011). This 
paper attempts to understand inter-firm network formed on account of director interlocks in India 
using the small world approach and analyse whether firm level constituents of small world 
property is related to firm outcome.  
Using a sample of NSE listed firms in India we find that the inter-firm network formed 
on account of sharing of directors is a small world. The small world feature essentially depends 
upon presence of linchpins in an otherwise sparsely connected network which reduces the path 
length drastically. The business group firms act as major linchpins in the network which 
highlights the powerful position of group firms in Indian corporate sector.  Further, since the 
introduction of corporate governance regulations, there appears to be a rise in integration within 
the network. To analyse whether firm level constituents of small world property affects firm 
behaviour we choose acquisition as a desirable firm outcome, since it is an important corporate 
level strategy for the firms to achieve its long run growth targets. Mostly acquisitions are 
undertaken for the purpose of diversification, vertical integration, market entry and others. Any 
acquisition proposal by the management of the firm has to be approved by board of directors 
before its implementation and it entails active involvement of directors. While searching for a 
target, the firm can obtain factual information about potential target from their financial 
statements, analysts‟ reports and various other sources. However, soft information regarding the 
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internal management of the potential target and their organisational culture may not be readily 
available in the market. The presence of inter-firm ties through interlocks can be an important 
source of availability of hard as well as soft information that reduce the search costs and help in 
identification of potential target. So, acquisition is a vital firm outcome that can determine the 
growth trajectory of the firm in the long run and interlocks may facilitate this process. 
We find that node level average path length is negatively associated with firm‟s 
probability of acquisition as it makes the search process for target firms longer. On the other 
hand there exist an inverted U-shaped relation between node level clustering and logit of 
probability of acquisition indicating the trade-off between the quality of information and amount 
of accessible information. The firm level small world measure and the network level small world 
statistic also have a quadratic relation with the likelihood function. Further, the group firms 
having more number of direct ties within the group are more affected by increase in distance 
from other firms in the network. We find that small world properties are also related to the 
probability of number of bids. The findings emphasise the role of director interlocks in 
transmission of soft information among the firms in the network.  
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is primarily twofold. Firstly, it 
adds to the small world literature by analysing small world feature of director interlocks driven 
inter-firm ties and highlights shrinking nature of network in the context of an emerging 
economy. Secondly, it contributes to the literature of ego-centric network studies by analysing 
the relationship of node level properties of clustering and average path length on probability of 
firm level acquisition tendencies. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the testable 
hypotheses and section 3 provides a description of data and the methodology followed. Section 4 
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presents the small world analysis of the interlock driven network. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical findings and section 6 gives the summary and conclusions of the study. 
2. Development of Hypotheses 
In the pre and post-independence era in India, director interlocks were observable phenomenon 
given the dearth of managerial talent (Mehta, 1955). Further Indian economy has been 
historically dominated by large business groups (Mehta, 1955; Sarkar, 2010) and often the 
promoter or his/her relatives occupy board positions of group companies for monitoring 
purposes. If directorial positions are occupied by few elites of the society leading to 
concentration of power; the inter-firm network formed as a result of directorial ties in India is 
expected to be a small world. In presence of concentrated ownership structure monitoring role of 
board becomes vital to ensure that majority shareholders do not expropriate minority 
shareholders. In order to protect shareholders‟ interests; the corporate governance regulations in 
the form of the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement was introduced in India in 2003 and was later 
revised in 2006
1
. The regulations led to a sudden increase in demand of directors in the 
directorial labour market. In such a scenario directors already serving on boards of firms may 
have been appointed as non-executive or independent directors by other firms for complying 
with the regulatory mandate. This may have led to further increase in concentration of 
managerial power in the hands of the few. It suggests that interlock driven network can not only 
be characterised as a small world, but post introduction of corporate governance regulations, the 
„small worldliness‟ of the network may have increased. We intend to analyse how firm level 
attributes of small world property may affect firm outcomes. 
                                                          
1
The regulation requires that at least half of the board of the listed firms is composed of non-executive directors. The 
proportion of independent directors needs to at least one-third for boards that are headed by a non-executive director 
and at least fifty percent in case the board has an executive chairman. 
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We consider an important firm level strategic decision – probability to acquire another 
firm - as the desired outcome variable. As discussed above, the process of identifying a potential 
target is largely dependent on availability of both hard and soft information about the target firm. 
The interlocked director network can provide access to hard as well as soft information to the 
firm. As financial markets develops, the availability of hard or factual information in form of 
financial reports, stock prices and analysts‟ reports increases. However, it is also important to 
obtain knowledge about other factors like management style, employee diversity and human 
resource policies of the potential target in order to ensure a seamless and successful merger. Such 
information can be categorised as soft information. Given the importance of inter-firm network 
in transmission of soft information among the firms which may not be otherwise available in the 
market, network level properties can be vital in influencing firm policies like acquisition.  
The acquiring firm‟s search for a potential target largely depends upon availability of 
timely information about potential target. Assuming that each tie is an information source, then a 
firm (node) that is farther away from other firms (nodes) is likely to have access to lesser 
information due to slower reach. This is to say that as the average path length of the firm 
increases the flow of vital information falls. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1a: The increase in average path length of firm is negatively associated with its 
probability of acquisition. 
On the other hand, clustering has two opposing effects on the flow of information. 
Clustering can enhance flow of information in two ways. Firstly, clustering can build trust 
among members of the cluster leading to efficient flow of information (Coleman, 1988). In a 
cluster as each member is directly connected to other; any deviation from cooperation is 
observable and can be punished by the cluster members and this can act as a threat to firm‟s 
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reputation. Secondly, as clustering rises information available to the firm can reach other firms 
faster due to presence of ties among neighbours and also ensures better quality of information. 
On the contrary clustering can be viewed as localisation of information or lack of availability of 
diverse information. The members of highly clustered group have no or less number of ties 
outside the cluster which shrinks the pool of available resources and such clustering may not 
provide significant information benefit to the firm. According to Burt (2004); ties with same set 
of nodes leads to informational redundancy.  
While searching for a potential target, both quality of information as well as availability 
of diverse information about other firms in the network is important. Thus, there exists a trade-
off between quality of information available to the firm and the variety of information that the 
firm can access. Ex-ante it appears that that there exists a non-linear relation between the extent 
of clustering in the network and probability of acquisition. Uzzi and Spiro (2005) find a 
parabolic relation between the level of clustering in the Broadway artist network and the 
creativity of the members. At lower levels, an increase in clustering can enhance the quality of 
transmitted information due to trust within the cluster and this is the information quality effect. 
However, after a threshold is reached any further increase in clustering may circulate same 
information within the network providing no informational advantage to the firms. This is the 
information redundancy effect as highlighted by Burt (2004). So, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 1b: At lower levels an increase in firm level clustering has a positive effect on the 
probability of acquisition, however post a threshold level any further increase in clustering is 
likely to be negatively related to the probability of acquisition. 
 Given that group firms have different characteristics than standalone firms in emerging 
markets, the relation between firm level small world characteristics and probability of acquisition 
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may also differ for these sub-samples. The group firms in India have number of directorial ties 
within the group (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012) and lesser number of ties with standalone firms. 
These group firms may already possess information about other firms in its group through pre-
existing channels like equity ownership and transfer of goods. In such a scenario directorial ties 
with group firms can provide less informational advantage than standalone firms. Having strong 
ties within the group may not be always beneficial and having weaker ties with members outside 
the group may provide vital information
2
 to group firms (Granovetter, 1973). The less number of 
ties with standalone firms or firms belonging to other business groups reduce the availability of 
diverse information and as a result the informational redundancy effect is likely to dominate the 
effect of superior quality of the information within the cluster at much lower levels. This leads to 
the next set of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: The negative relation between average path length and probability of acquisition 
will be stronger for group firms. 
Hypothesis 2b: The negative informational redundancy effect of clustering will outweigh the 
positive informational quality effect at lower levels for group firms. 
 If firm level small world properties help in dissemination of soft information which may 
be important in acquisition deals, then the availability of such information is also likely to be 
related to the probability of the number of acquisition bids initiated by the firm in the following 
year.  This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: The increase in average path length of firm is negatively associated with 
probability of more number of acquisition bids by the firm. 
                                                          
2
Granovetter‟s (1973) study finds that weak ties are more important for obtaining job referrals than direct ties.  
8 
 
Hypothesis 3b: An increase in firm’s clustering has a positive effect on the probability of number 
of acquisition bids at lower levels, but at higher levels of clustering the probability of number of 
acquisition bids are likely to fall.  
3. Data and Methodology 
Our analysis relies on the data provided by the Prowess database maintained by the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess is a database containing detailed information on 
large and medium Indian firms from their respective annual reports. It contains activity codes of 
firms, equity ownership pattern, financial data as well as the names of the directors of firms. The 
sample consists of all firms listed on the National Stock Exchange of India in 2012 for which 
information on their board of directors was available for 2003, 2007 and 2012. The study 
considers listed firms in 2012 which is the most recent year for which data is available. Further, 
the firms are traced back in 2003 and 2007 to focus on firms immediately after the introduction 
of corporate governance regulations in March 2003, and also in the period post the 
implementation of the revised Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement in January 2006 respectively. 
We only consider the firms who are members of giant component of the network for this 
analysis. The giant component of a graph is the maximally connected sub-graph such that all its 
members are connected either directly or indirectly. This ensures that the distance between any 
two firms in the network is finite. Post screening we arrived at a sample of 3130 firm year 
observations.  
3.1 Small World Statistic 
The small world statistic is defined as the ratio of clustering coefficient to average path length of 
the graph. The clustering coefficient of a node i is given by the probability that nodes connected 
to i are themselves connected. In other words it represents the transitivity property of a node and 
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is given as:                      . Clustering coefficient of firm i gives the probability 
that two firms j and k are connected given that firm i has direct ties with firms j and k. The 
average path length is the number of links in geodesic between node i and all other nodes and is 
given by:      
∑            
 
, where N is the number of nodes in the network and l(i,j) is number of 
links between nodes i and j. The graph level clustering coefficient and average path length is 
simply the average of node level clustering coefficients and average path lengths respectively. 
In order to compare the ratio, general norm is to normalise it with the ratio of clustering 
coefficient to average path length of a random graph with same number of nodes. Watts and 
Strogatz (1998) suggested that if ties are formed entirely in a random manner for a graph with N 
nodes and average degree k then the average path length (APLR) tends to LogN/Logk and 
clustering coefficient (CCR) can be approximated by k/N. Thus, the small world statistic (SW) of 
graph is given as:     
  
   
   
   
    
 .If the SW statistic is greater than one then the graph is 
said to be a small world. However, most of the studies find that SW statistic much larger than 
one and the obtained value of the SW statistic increases with the number of nodes in the network. 
3.2 Acquisition Behaviour 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The firm‟s decision to acquire another firm in a particular year is likely to depend on accounting 
information, strategy and resources in the previous year. Hence, for predicting acquisitions we 
collect information on mergers and acquisitions announcements in 2004, 2008 and 2013 of the 
firms listed with NSE. We consider all bids that were made by firms in these years including 
failed bids. The aim of the analysis is to study the role of non-market information in predicting 
probability of making a bid and not necessarily a successful bid. The dependent variable 
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„acquire’ is a dummy which takes the value one if the firm has initiated any acquisition bid 
during 2004, 2008 or 2013 and zero otherwise. 
It is possible that a firm makes more than one acquisitions announcements during the 
year, however, multiple announcements are not captured by our „acquire‟ variable. In order to 
focus on the number of bids made by a particular firm during the year we define a variable called 
‘number of bids’ which takes the value zero if the firm did not initiate any bid, assumes the value 
one if the firm initiates one deal, and equals two if the firm initiates more than one acquisitions 
during the year. 
3.2.2 Control Variables 
In the regression analysis, we control for firm‟s level of leverage, market to book value ratio, 
firm size, group affiliation, profitability and cash flow. The more leveraged a firm, lower is its 
likelihood of acquiring another firm. We define leverage as debt to equity ratio of the firm. 
Studies suggest that acquiring firms are likely to have high market to book ratio (Andrade et al., 
2001; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008), hence we control for the market to book value ratio 
given as the ratio of market value of equity to net worth of firm. The more profitable firms and 
those with more cash flow are more likely to acquire as they have more resources at their 
disposal. We use the ratio of profit before depreciation, income tax and amortization (PBDITA) 
to total sales as a proxy for cash flow of the firm. We consider size of firm as a proxy for its 
market power. The larger firms are more likely to acquire firms to increase its current market 
power. The size of firm is given by the logarithm of total assets. Affiliation to a group can also 
affect acquisition behaviour. The group firms can engage in more acquisition activities in order 
to diversify into newer industries. Also, firms affiliated to a group can obtain financial resources 
from other group firms and get access to external funding at lower rates (Gopalan et al., 2007). 
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Thus, group firms can be in a better position to obtain funding required for merger and 
acquisition. Group affiliation is given by group dummy which takes the value one if firm belongs 
to a business group and zero otherwise. In addition to these control suggested by literature, we 
also control for the centrality of firm in the network on account of director interlocks. The 
resource dependence view suggests that the firms having director interlocks are in a favourable 
position to access information which can be vital for strategic behaviour like acquisition. We 
control for firm‟s centrality in the network using eigen measure of centrality proposed by 
Bonacich (1972, 1987).The eigen centrality gives importance to quality of ties of each firm i.e. 
each firm‟s centrality is measured as the weighted sum of its ties where weights are the scores of 
qualitative ties of connected firm. Intuitively, say firm i is connected to firm j which in turn is 
connected to other well connected firms, as a result i will be in a stronger position in the network 
in terms of access to information and power. Thus, the eigen vector centrality of each node is a 
proportion of the sum of centrality of the neighbouring nodes. It is given as    
     
∑       
          where  
     is an eigen vector of A and   is its eigen value. As relations in 
network are assumed to be either positive or neutral, only non-negative eigen values are 
considered. Bonacich suggested that eigen vector associated with largest eigen value be 
considered as the centrality of firm. We also incorporate industry and time dummies in order to 
control for industry and time specific factors respectively. 
3.3 Methodology 
We use a logit specification for the analysis of hypotheses 1a-2b and the model is given as: 
           
 
          
                                                                                                             
where                             
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Equation 2 gives the linear relation between the regressors and the logit (Li) and equation 
3 gives the change in probability of an outcome for an incremental change in the regressors (X) 
which is a non-linear relation. Specifically for the average path length and clustering coefficient 
we estimate models given by equations 4-5 respectively.  
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 ∑   
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where       is the one year ahead probability of an acquisition bid by the firm. 
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b we apply an ordered logit model wherein our dependent 
variable is number of acquisition bids unlike acquire dummy in the above specification. We use 
an ordered logit instead of count data models as number of bids is a categorical variable (number 
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of bids variable takes the value zero when firm do not initiate any bid, one corresponds to single 
bid and the dependent variable assumes two when there are more than one bid by the firm).  This 
model is also called proportional odds model since it assumes that all the variables on the right 
hand side of the equation are related in the same manner across different thresholds. So, for three 
categories of the ordinal variable the conditional and cumulative probabilities are given as: 
           {
                                                 
                                  
                                              
            (6) 
  
           
           
             
                                                                                            (7)                                             
We carry out one and 99 percent winsorisation of the data to ensure that results are not 
affected by presence of extreme values of the variables. 
4. Small World Analysis 
Panel A of table 1 indicates that the giant component of inter-firm network constitutes 89 percent 
of firms in 2012 vis-à-vis 72 percent firms in 2003. This suggests that more firms are becoming 
part of maximally connected network over the years. Further, clustering has remained almost 
stable, however, average distance among firms have decreased during the period. The average 
number of direct connections of the firm on account of sharing of directors given by degree 
measure increased to 10.59 in 2007 as compared to 7.67 in 2003. However, between 2007 and 
2012 average degree marginally increased from 10.59 to 11.23. The average path length of 
empirical graph is closer to that of a random graph in absolute terms, but inter-firm network 
appears to be highly clustered vis-à-vis corresponding random graph and as a result the small 
world statistic is much larger than one.  
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Even though the value of one has been used as a benchmark; calculated statistic value 
increases with rise in number of nodes of the graph. We tabulate the small world statistic values 
obtained in few other small world studies on ownership and director networks in panel B of table 
1. Our small world statistic ranges from 21.17 to 31.02 and appears to be comparable to the value 
of 22.46 for German board network of 291 nodes (Kogut and Walker, 2001) and higher than the 
value of 11.84 found for US board network of 600 nodes (Davis et al., 2003). This suggests that 
director interlocks in India may not be a purely random outcome and inter-firm network driven 
by director interlocks in India does appear to be a small world.    
The small world phenomenon prevails due to presence of few shortcuts in an otherwise 
sparse network. Few firms connect distant clusters within the network and they are called 
„linchpins‟ or „structural holes‟ (Burt, 2004) within the network. To identify linchpins in the 
network, we compute betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1979) of firms. Betweenness centrality 
of firm i is defined as the ratio of the number of shortest paths connecting j and k that pass 
through i and the overall number of shortest paths that connect j and k. If this ratio is close to 1, 
then i lies on most of the shortest paths connecting k to j, while if it is close to 0, then i is less 
critical to k and j. Let Pi(kj) denote the number of geodesics between j and k that i lies on, and let 
P(kj) be the total number of geodesics between j and k . Then betweenness centrality is given 
by:∑
      
                
. The top ten firms along with their group affiliation and rankings based on 
their betweenness scores in each years of analysis are given in panel A of table 2. In all years 
mostly business group firms constitutes major linchpins in the network. Panel B of table 2 lists 
firms which act as linchpins in more than one year of analysis. Ceat Ltd belonging to RPG 
Enterprises Group and HDFC of HDFC Group were consistently among the top ten firms based 
on betweenness centrality in last decade. Also, in 2003 and 2007 three common firms occupied 
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the top ten positions and four most central firms in 2007 also remained central in 2012. This 
suggests that among business group firms few have consistently acted as linchpins in the network 
contributing towards small worldliness of the network.       
It is evident from table 1 that number of firms forming the giant component has 
consistently increased and magnitude of average distance among firms has decreased from 2003 
to 2012. The results in table 3 suggest that the fall in average path length from 2003 to 2007 and 
between 2003 and 2012 is significant. The simultaneous increase in size of giant component 
along with the decrease in distance among its member can be considered as an indication that the 
network is becoming more integrated (Goyal et al., 2006) or in other words „small worldliness‟ 
of the network is rising. In addition, absolute value of small world statistic has also consistently 
increased during this period. Thus, inter-firm network in India can be characterised as a small 
world and it appears that small worldliness of the network has risen in last decade. The 
increasing small worldliness of the network suggests that managerial power in India is getting 
more and more concentrated in the hands of few elites of the society. 
5. Acquisition Analysis 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 gives year-wise distribution of firm outcome variable i.e. number of firms that offered an 
acquisition bid in the following year. Out of the total 456 acquisition bids, 251 are by group 
firms and remaining 205 bids are by standalone firms. The number of acquisition bids in 2008 
was 234 which is maximum among the three years under consideration.  
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for full sample of firms and also for group and 
standalone firms separately. The firms within the network can be on average reached through 
other four intermediate firms. The mean clustering coefficient is 0.34 suggesting that around 34 
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percent of a firm‟s neighbours are themselves connected in the network. The results of simple 
two sided mean t-test indicates that group firms are on average larger, connected to more 
connected firms in the network given by higher average and median eigen measure of centrality 
and have smaller path lengths compared to their standalone counterparts. However, the 
performance of group firms and standalone firms given by return on assets and market-to-book 
value on average do not appear to vary significantly. The Wilcoxon signed rank test does suggest 
that median performance of group firms is better than that of standalone firms. 
5.2 Regression Results 
The result of analysing equation 4 is given in column 1 of table 6. It indicates that after 
controlling for other factors as firm level average path length increases the likelihood of 
acquisition falls. Thus, farther away a firm is from others in the network; information takes 
longer to reach the firm which in turn increases search time for a target. As search process 
becomes longer the probability of acquisition decreases. This provides support for our hypothesis 
1a that time required for flow of information among firms can potentially be related to 
probability of acquisition.  
Column 2 of table 6 gives regression result of effect of clustering on probability of 
acquisition given by equation 5. The parameter estimates of linear and quadratic terms of 
clustering coefficient indicate that there exists a non-linear inverted U-shaped relation between 
firm‟s local clustering and logit function corresponding to the probability of acquisition. Initially 
an increase in clustering among firms in the network can be beneficial as high quality 
information is shared among members of the cluster due to trust factor. This is the informational 
quality effect in network. Also, given large number of direct connections among members of the 
cluster information spreads rapidly. However, there are diminishing returns to additional 
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information in network and once a threshold level is reached, any further increase in clustering 
negatively affects the firm. A firm belonging to a highly clustered local network has very few 
ties with firms outside the cluster. This reduces variety of information available to the firm and 
same information circulates within the cluster and gives rise to information redundancy effect. 
Very high clustering makes search for the target difficult and in turn negatively affects 
probability of acquisition.  
The negative informational redundancy effect of clustering outweighs the positive 
informational quality effect when clustering in network exceeds 0.41 which is just above mean 
level of clustering (0.34) in the network. Around 30 percent of firm year observations have a 
clustering greater than 0.41 and for remaining 70 percent of firms in India clustering can be 
helpful in providing vital information about potential target. This indicates that only excessive 
clustering may not provide any informational advantage to firms and can actually be detrimental. 
In agreement to hypothesis 1b, we find that above a threshold level of clustering; the 
informational redundancy effect within network dominates the informational quality effect 
leading to inverted U-shaped relation between node level clustering and underlying logit 
function. 
Now, we consider the ratio of firm level clustering coefficient and average path length 
which we call the firm-level small world measure and re-estimate the relation. The results in 
column 3 of table 6 gives that firm level small world measure initially increases probability of 
acquisition and similar to clustering coefficient has a negative relation at higher levels. The 
threshold level of firm level small world measure post which there exist a negative association is 
36.57 which is higher than both mean and median firm level small world measure. 
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With respect to control variables we observe that the firms which are more profitable 
given by return on assets are more likely to acquire. Also, larger firms are expected to engage 
more in acquisitions to increase their market power. The coefficient of leverage is negative 
indicating that firms that have higher debts are less likely to acquire. The coefficient of eigen is 
positive and significant highlighting that strength of direct connections can be an important 
source of information and resources for the firm. However, group affiliation, cash flow and 
firm‟s market to book value ratio are not related to firm‟s probability of acquisition. 
Now, to analyse the effect of group affiliation on probability of firm outcome relation, we 
split the sample into of group and standalone firms and re-estimate the results. The firms 
belonging to a business group have more number of ties within the group and lesser number of 
ties with standalone firms which in turn shrink its pool of available information. Thus, ex-ante 
group affiliation can directly have a negative effect on availability of information about potential 
targets. Table 7a presents the results for sub-sample of group firms. Column1 gives coefficient of 
average path length which is negative and significant at one percent level of significance. Similar 
to the full-sample result the clustering and firm level small world measures have a non-linear 
relation with the logit function (columns2-3). The inflection points for clustering coefficient and 
firm level small world measure is at 0.42 and 35.38 respectively which is similar to the levels 
observed for the full sample. Table 7b gives the results for standalone firms. The average path 
length has a negative and significant coefficient. The magnitude of parameter estimate of average 
path length variable for group firms is higher than standalone firms. It indicates that negative 
relation between average path length and probability of acquisition is stronger for group firms. 
The results suggest that negative effect of increasing average path length is stronger for group 
firms in accordance to hypothesis 2a. The clustering coefficient and firm level small world 
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statistic is not significant for standalone firms. It appears that the full sample results are 
essentially driven by group firms in the sample. The coefficient of firm size is positive and 
significant for both group and standalone firms. The return on asset and leverage are significant 
only for the set group firms and turns out to be insignificant for standalone firms. The eigen 
measure appears to mainly affect the standalone firms.  
Table 8 presents the result obtained from ordered logistic regression. The dependent 
variable has three categories i.e. whether the firm is a non-acquirer, initiates single bid or 
initiates more than one bid. It is evident that the nature of relation between small world 
characteristics and the number of acquisitions mimics the logistic regression results. For 
example, column 1 suggests that a unit increase in log odds of average path length decreases the 
chances of being in the two higher categories by 0.44. The cut 1 and cut 2 are the ancillary 
parameters which differentiates the three categories. Cut 1 gives that the observations whose 
latent variable values are less than 3.79 are classified as non-acquirers when all the explanatory 
variables are assumed to be zero. Similarly, all the observations above 6.08 will be classified as 
multiple bidders and the values between 3.79 and 6.08 corresponds to firms with single bids. The 
assumption of parallel regression was not rejected by the Brant‟s test (not reported). The findings 
reiterate that small world characteristics are not only important in predicting probability of 
acquisition, but can also be related to the likelihood of number of acquisition bids as suggested 
by hypotheses 3a and 3b.  
5.3 Robustness Analyses 
To check the persistence of results, we carry out several robustness tests. First we consider 
alternate specification of firm size and profitability variables. The alternate firm size and 
profitability indicators are given by logarithm of total income and return on equity (ROE) 
20 
 
respectively. ROE is defined as the ratio of post-tax profit to net worth of firm. Column 1 of 
table 9 indicates that the relation between firm level small world measure and probability of 
acquisition are qualitatively similar under alternate definition of control variables. Further, it is 
possible that firm which has higher growth potential is more likely to acquire other firms in order 
to grow faster. We include R&D, advertising and marketing expenses to total income as a proxy 
for growth opportunities in the model for predicting acquisition as an additional control. The 
results obtained from the re-estimation with additional control variable along with set of alternate 
control variables and are given in column 2 of table 9. We find that the relation between 
probability of acquisition and firm level small world measure is robust to the inclusion of 
additional control variable of growth opportunity and alternate definition of firm size and firm 
performance variables.  
We know that for any network, clustering is the conditional probability of a tie between 
nodes j and k when there already exists a tie between i and j and i and k respectively and the 
density of a graph is given by the probability that there exists a tie among any two nodes j and k. 
So, for a random network the clustering coefficient of a node i is equal to density of the graph 
and can be written as:   
        (     |         )   (     )                                                     
With the help of the above definition, we create a variable called distance from 
randomness similar to Davis et al. (2012) which is simply the difference between node level 
clustering coefficient from year-wise density of graph.  
                                                                                                            
This distance from randomness variable gives a proxy measure of the wedge between 
clustering in empirical graph to that of a hypothetical random graph. We re-estimate equation 5 
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using the alternate measure of firm level clustering given by the distance from randomness 
variable along with the alternate set of control variables discussed above. Column3 of table 9 
gives that linear term of distance from randomness is positive and significant at five percent level 
of significance and the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative and significant at one percent 
level of significance. The point of inflection of the curve is also 0.41 which similar to the full 
sample results discussed earlier. Thus, the results are robust to the alternate specification of the 
interest variable clustering coefficient along with the inclusion of alternate set of controls.   
Given that there is a quadratic relation between small-world measure and logit of 
probability of acquisition, it is also possible to present the above relation using a spline 
specification. A linear spline is a continuous function which joins pieces of linear segments and 
is also referred to as piece-wise regression. The points of intersection of the linear segments are 
known as the knots of the function. A linear spline with one knot joins two linear segments and 
the coefficient value remains constant in each of the two segments. We define a spline of degree 
two having a single knot for firm level small world measure. We specify the knot at 36 which is 
the inflection point for the firm level small world measure. Column4 gives that coefficient of 
spline1is positive and significant and that of spline2 is negative and significant. The spline 
specification also indicates the quadratic nature of relation between small world measure and 
logit of probability of acquisition.   
Finally, the number of events in our sample is 456 out of 3130 which appears to be 
adequate for logistic estimation. However, we also re-estimate the specification using Firth‟s bias 
correction method which corrects for bias in samples having less number of events. Column 5 
suggests that the sign and significance of the coefficients remain same under Firth logistic 
regression technique.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
The study finds that inter-firm network formed on account of director interlocks since the 
introduction of corporate governance regulations in India can be characterised as a small world. 
The network is highly clustered and the average distance among the firms has decreased between 
2003 and 2012. The numbers of firms that are either directly or indirectly connected to each 
other have also increased in this period. A simultaneous decrease in average path length and an 
expanding size of the giant component of the network suggests that small worldliness of inter-
firm network has increased during the period. This may be attributed to regulatory requirements 
pertaining to non-executive and independent directors in India. The introduction of corporate 
governance regulations could have led to a sudden increase in demand of directors in the 
directorial labour market. However, in presence of sticky supply curve for expert directors; the 
individuals already serving on boards were appointed as non-executive or independent directors 
by other firms for complying with regulatory mandate.  
Further, the paper finds that directorial ties can be effective channels of transfer of hard 
as well as soft information among connected firms. The firms can access hard information 
through various channels; however director interlocks can be vital for assimilation of soft 
information which may not be otherwise readily available in the market. The node level average 
path length appears to be negatively associated with probability of firm‟s acquisition tendencies. 
As average path length increases, it takes longer for information to reach the firm making search 
process longer. There exists an inverted U-shaped relation between firm level clustering and the 
likelihood of acquisition. Initially clustering has positive effect due to trust in sharing of 
information and faster transmission of information within members of the cluster. This is the 
informational quality effect in the network. However, at higher levels the lack of diverse 
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information within cluster tends to have a negative effect. The results are similar to Uzzi and 
Spiro‟s (2005) findings in their study of small world of Broadway artist network and its effect on 
their creativity. The threshold level post which the negative effect sets in is much higher than 
mean and median level of clustering for firms, suggesting that majority of the Indian firms 
benefit from clustering within the network.  
The study highlights that regulations can inadvertently contribute towards small 
worldliness of the network which may be related to firm level outcomes. The paper highlights 
the importance of directorial ties in transmission of soft information among the firms which in 
turn can affect firm level strategic decisions like acquisitions. So, firms intending to expand 
through the acquisition route can potentially value interlocks as means of obtaining soft 
information. The firm level analysis emphasises the importance of faster reach of information 
within network in form of shorter path length. However, clustering in the network leads to a 
trade-off between the availability of superior quality of information and lack of availability of 
diverse information. Hence, within the network, firms would prefer to be close to all other firms, 
but would desire moderate level of clustering. Further research using small world framework can 
test whether the presence of clustering among Indian firms have other benefits like promoting 
innovation or sharing and adopting good corporate governance practices which can enhance the 
productivity of the firms and make them more competitive.  
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Table 1: Small World of Director Interlock Driven Network 
Panel A gives the year-wise small world statistic and other topological properties of interlock driven inter-firm 
network. The small world statistic is given as the ratio of clustering coefficient to the average path length of the after 
being normalised with respect to a random graph with same number of nodes and average degree. The average path 
length is the average of distances among all the nodes in the network. The clustering coefficient is the average of 
node level clustering coefficients of all the nodes which is given by the probability that the neighbours of a node are 
themselves connected. Average degree is defined the mean of the number of direct connections of all the nodes in 
the network. Panel B presents a summary of few of the previous small world studies on board and ownership 
networks.  
 
 
 Panel A   
 2003 2007 2012 
Vertices 897 1381 1539 
Edges 2501 6162 7698 
Vertices in giant component 644 1159 1366 
Edges in largest component 2127 5322 6594 
Average degree 7.67 10.59 11.23 
Average path length 4.27 3.98 3.96 
Clustering coefficient 0.34 0.35 0.34 
Average path length (Random) 3.17 2.99 2.98 
Clustering coefficient (Random) 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Small world statistic 21.17 28.98 31.02 
   Panel B     
Authors Network Nodes in 
giant 
component 
APL CC APL 
(random) 
CC 
(random) 
SW-
statistic 
Kogut 
and 
Walker 
(2001) 
German firm 
network 
291 5.64 0.84 3.01 0.022 22.46 
German 
ownership 
network 
429 6.09 0.83 5.16 0.008 100.48 
Davis et 
al. (2003) 
US board 
network 
600 4.27 0.88 2.93 0.016 11.84 
US director 
network 
5311 4.33 0.87 3.06 0.003 183.03 
Mani 
(2012) 
Indian 
ownership 
network 
1050 firms 
and 5727 
individuals 
1.52 2.13E-07 2.69 1.831E-09 201.13 
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Table 2: Top Ten Linchpins in the Network 
Panel A gives the top ten firms which acted as linchpins in the network for each year under analysis based on their 
betweenness centrality scores. The betweenness centrality is computed as the ratio of number of shortest path 
connecting two nodes „j‟ and „k‟ that passes through node „i' to total number of shortest paths connecting nodes „j‟ 
and „k‟. It also provides group affiliation as given by CMIE Prowess and year-wise rankings of top ten firms. Panel 
B gives firms which featured among the top ten central firms in more than one year along with their year-wise 
rankings. 
Panel A 
 2003 2007 2012 
Rank Firm Group Firm Group Firm Group 
   
    
  
1 I C I C I Bank Ltd. ICICI Group Ceat Ltd. RPG 
Enterprises 
Group 
Housing 
Development 
Finance 
Corpn. Ltd. 
HDFC Group 
2 Ceat Ltd. RPG 
Enterprises 
Group 
Housing 
Development 
Finance 
Corpn. Ltd. 
HDFC Group Shipping 
Corpn. Of 
India Ltd. 
Central 
Government 
3 Tata Steel Ltd. Tata Group Jaiprakash 
Associates 
Ltd. 
Jaypee 
Group 
Tata Power 
Co. Ltd. 
Tata Group 
4 Housing 
Development 
Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
HDFC Group Hindustan 
Motors Ltd. 
Birla C.K. 
Group 
Jaypee 
Infratech Ltd. 
Jaypee 
Group 
5 Piramal Enterprises 
Ltd. 
Piramal Ajay 
Group 
Tube 
Investments 
Of India Ltd. 
Murugappa 
Chettiar 
Group 
Lakshmi 
Precision 
Screws Ltd. 
Private 
(Indian) 
6 Larsen & Toubro 
Ltd. 
Larsen & 
Toubro Group 
Aditya Birla 
Nuvo Ltd. 
Birla Aditya 
Group 
Ceat Ltd. RPG 
Enterprises 
Group 
7 Atul Ltd. Lalbhai Group Ambuja 
Cements Ltd. 
Holcim (F) 
Group 
Jaiprakash 
Associates 
Ltd. 
Jaypee 
Group 
8 Mahindra & 
Mahindra Ltd. 
Mahindra & 
Mahindra 
Group 
Shipping 
Corpn. Of 
India Ltd. 
Central 
Government 
Ashok 
Leyland Ltd. 
Hinduja 
(Ashok 
Leyland) 
Group 
9 Grasim Industries 
Ltd. 
Birla Aditya 
Group 
Tata Steel 
Ltd. 
Tata Group Taj G V K 
Hotels & 
Resorts Ltd. 
GVK Reddy 
(Novopan) 
Group 
10 Southern 
Petrochemical Inds. 
Corpn. Ltd. 
Chidambaram 
M.A. Group 
A C C Ltd. Holcim (F) 
Group 
Jindal Steel & 
Power Ltd. 
Om Prakash 
Jindal Group 
Panel B 
 Rank in 2003 Rank in 2007 Rank in 2012 
Ceat Ltd. 2 1 6 
Tata Steel Ltd. 3 9 - 
Housing Development 
Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
4 2 1 
Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. - 3 7 
Shipping Corpn. Of India 
Ltd. 
- 8 2 
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Table 3: Summary of Network Properties 
The table gives the significance of mean and variance of average path length, clustering coefficient and average 
degree for each pair of years under analysis based on two tailed difference of mean t-tests. The average path length 
is the average of distance among all the nodes in the network. The clustering coefficient is the average of node level 
clustering coefficients of all the nodes which is given by the probability that the neighbours of a node are themselves 
connected. Average degree is defined the mean of the number of direct connections of all the nodes in the network. 
 2003  2007  2012  
 Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
Average path length 4.26 0.79 3.98*** 0.46*** 3.96*** 0.47*** 
Clustering coefficient 0.34 0.10 0.35 0.08*** 0.34 0.08*** 
Average degree 7.67 53.13 10.59*** 98.77*** 11.23 99.07*** 
Significance at 1 percent is denoted by ****. 
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Table 4: Year-wise Acquisition Bids by Firms 
The table gives the year-wise number of firms who made an acquisition bid and its distribution by the type of firm. 
Group affiliations of firms are based on the business group classification data provided by CMIE Prowess. All firms 
which are not classified as group firms are categorised as standalone firms. 
 
Number of a firms 
making acquisition 
bids 
2004 2008 2013 Total 
Group 53 124 74 251 
Standalone 33 110 62 205 
All firms 86 234 136 456 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistic 
The table presents summary statistics for full sample of firms as well as for business group firms and standalone 
firms. Firm size is defined as logarithm of total assets during the year. Leverage ratio gives the debt equity ratio. 
Cash flow is defined as ratio of PBDITA to total sales of firm. Market to book value is given by ratio of market 
value of equity to net value of firm and return on assets is ratio of profit before interest and taxes to total assets. The 
average path length is the average of distances among all the nodes in network. The clustering coefficient is average 
of node level clustering coefficients of all nodes which is given by the probability that neighbours of a node are 
themselves connected. Small world measure is the normalised ratio of clustering coefficient and average path length. 
Eigen is a measure of how well connected are the direct connections of the firm. The significance of mean is based 
on two tailed difference of mean t-test. The significance in median is based on results of Wilcoxon signed rank test 
for difference of medians.  
 
 All firms Standalone firms Group firms 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Firm size 8.72 8.54 8.65** 8.42*** 8.80 8.67 
Leverage 1.22 0.68 1.21 0.67 1.23 0.68 
Cash flow 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.16 0.23 0.16 
Market-to-book value 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.12*** 0.21 0.10 
Return on assets 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12* 0.13 0.12 
Average path length 4.03 3.87 4.13 3.98 3.93*** 3.78*** 
Clustering coefficient 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.29** 0.35 0.29 
Small-world measure 29.59 26.35 29.05 25.90** 30.11 26.71 
Eigen 0.03 0.00 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.03 0.00 
Significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels are denoted by ****, **, * respectively. 
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Table 6: Small World Characteristic and Probability of Acquisition 
The table reports parameter estimates obtained from logit regression of node level network properties of average 
path length, clustering coefficient, firm level small world measure on probability of acquisition bids. The dependent 
variable is given by acquire dummy which takes the value one if firm has made an acquisition bid in the following 
year and zero otherwise. The average path length is average of distance of a particular node i from all other nodes in 
network. The clustering coefficient gives the probability that neighbours of a node are themselves connected. Small 
world statistic gives normalised ratio of clustering to average path length. The values in parenthesis are standard 
errors clustered at individual firm level. The independent variables are a set of firm characteristic variables, group 
dummy, industry dummies and year dummies. 
 
Variables Column1 Column2 Column3 
    
Average path length -0.428***   
 (0.115)   
Clustering coefficient   1.416**  
  (0.612)  
Clustering coefficient* Clustering 
coefficient 
 -1.737***  
 (0.621)  
Firm level small world   0.015** 
   (0.007) 
Firm level small world * Firm level small 
world 
  -0.000** 
  (0.000) 
Leverage -0.086* -0.087* -0.086* 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
Group dummy 0.018 0.041 0.041 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
Return on assets 1.249** 1.516*** 1.555*** 
 (0.590) (0.585) (0.585) 
Market to book ratio 0.052 0.043 0.043 
 (0.104) (0.106) (0.106) 
Firm size 0.264*** 0.297*** 0.300*** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Cash flow -0.357 -0.408 -0.409 
 (0.263) (0.266) (0.266) 
Eigen measure 0.988* 1.578*** 1.671*** 
 (0.568) (0.550) (0.549) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -15.210*** -17.307*** -18.415*** 
 (0.892) (0.642) (0.429) 
Observations 3,130 3,130 3,130 
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.086 0.084 
Significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels are denoted by ****, **, * respectively against the 
parameter estimate values. The Pseudo R-squared corresponds to McFadden‟s R-squared values. 
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Table 7a: Small World Characteristic and Probability of Acquisition-Group Firms 
The table reports parameter estimates obtained from logit regression of node level network properties of average 
path length, clustering coefficient, firm level small world measure on probability of acquisition bids for the sub-
sample of group firms. The dependent variable is given by acquire dummy which takes the value one if the firm has 
made an acquisition bid in the following year and zero otherwise. The average path length is the average of distance 
of a particular node i from all other nodes in the network. The clustering coefficient gives the probability that the 
neighbours of a node are themselves connected. Small world statistic gives the normalised ratio of clustering to 
average path length. The values in parenthesis are standard errors clustered at individual firm level. The independent 
variables are a set of firm characteristic variables, industry dummies and year dummies. 
Variables Column1 Column2 Column3 
    
Average path length -0.518***   
 (0.169)   
Clustering coefficient   2.510***  
  (0.942)  
Clustering coefficient* Clustering 
coefficient 
 -2.976***  
 2.510***  
Firm level small world   0.029** 
   (0.012) 
Firm level small world* Firm level small 
world 
  -0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
Leverage -0.128** -0.127** -0.125* 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) 
Return on assets 1.532* 1.758** 1.787** 
 (0.815) (0.832) (0.827) 
Market to book ratio 0.055 0.029 0.029 
 (0.156) (0.161) (0.161) 
Firm size 0.341*** 0.377*** 0.372*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Cash flow -0.218 -0.283 -0.265 
 (0.336) (0.345) (0.343) 
Eigen measure 0.222 0.777 0.907 
 (0.695) (0.653) (0.653) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -14.237*** -17.006*** -17.108*** 
 (1.175) (0.850) (0.797) 
Observations 1,584 1,584 1,584 
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.112 0.110 
Significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels are denoted by ****, **, * respectively against the 
parameter estimate values. The Pseudo R-squared corresponds to McFadden‟s R-squared values. 
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Table 7b: Small World Characteristic and Probability of Acquisition- Standalone Firms 
The table reports parameter estimates obtained from logit regression of node level network properties of average 
path length, clustering coefficient, firm level small world measure on the probability of acquisition for the sub-
sample of standalone firms. The dependent variable is given by acquire dummy which takes the value one if the 
firm has made an acquisition bid in the following year and zero otherwise. The average path length is the average of 
distance of a particular node i from all other nodes in the network. The clustering coefficient gives the probability 
that the neighbours of a node are themselves connected. Small world statistic gives the normalised ratio of clustering 
to average path length. The values in parenthesis are standard errors clustered at individual firm level. The 
independent variables are a set of firm characteristic variables, industry dummies and year dummies. 
Variables Column1 Column2 Column3 
Average path length -0.344**   
 (0.163)   
Clustering coefficient   0.608  
  (0.825)  
Clustering coefficient* Clustering 
coefficient 
 -0.812  
 (0.840)  
Firm level small world   0.005 
   (0.010) 
Firm level small world* Firm level small 
world 
  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
Leverage -0.068 -0.072 -0.071 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) 
Return on assets 0.527 0.847 0.876 
 (0.895) (0.857) (0.861) 
Market to book ratio 0.067 0.074 0.073 
 (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) 
Firm size 0.225*** 0.259*** 0.266*** 
 (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) 
Cash flow -0.434 -0.489 -0.502 
 (0.408) (0.403) (0.406) 
Eigen measure 2.157* 2.964** 3.037** 
 (1.203) (1.194) (1.190) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -15.091*** -16.794*** -16.018*** 
 (1.295) (0.927) (0.910) 
Observations 1,516 1,516 1,516 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0797 0.0754 0.0747 
Significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels are denoted by ****, **, * respectively against the 
parameter estimate values. The Pseudo R-squared corresponds to McFadden‟s R-squared values. 
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Table 8: Small World Characteristic and Number of Acquisitions 
The table reports parameter estimates obtained from ordered logit regression of node level network properties of 
average path length, clustering coefficient, firm level small world measure on number of bids. The dependent 
variable is given by number of bids which takes the value zero if there are no acquisition bids, equals one if the firm 
has makes one acquisition bid and assumes the value two if there are more than one acquisition bids. The average 
path length is the average of distance of a particular node i from all other nodes in the network. The clustering 
coefficient gives the probability that the neighbours of a node are themselves connected. Small world statistic gives 
the normalised ratio of clustering to average path length. The values in parenthesis are standard errors clustered at 
individual firm level. The independent variables are a set of firm characteristic variables, group dummy, industry 
dummies and year dummies. 
Variables Column1 Column2 Column3 
    
Average path length -0.439***   
 (0.116)   
Clustering coefficient   1.349**  
  (0.608)  
Clustering coefficient* Clustering 
coefficient 
 -1.688***  
 (0.617)  
Firm level small world   0.014* 
   (0.007) 
Firm level small world* Firm level small 
world 
  -0.000** 
  (0.000) 
Leverage -0.089** -0.090** -0.089** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Group dummy 0.025 0.050 0.051 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Return of assets 1.222** 1.502*** 1.543*** 
 (0.584) (0.578) (0.577) 
Market to book ratio 0.062 0.052 0.051 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) 
Firm size 0.266*** 0.301*** 0.304*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Cash flow -0.360 -0.415 -0.416 
 (0.256) (0.258) (0.258) 
Eigen measure 1.026* 1.619*** 1.709*** 
 (0.576) (0.566) (0.564) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant (cut1) 3.791*** 6.100*** 6.162*** 
 (1.153) (1.031) (1.022) 
Constant (cut2) 6.079*** 8.382*** 8.443*** 
 (1.160) (1.035) (1.026) 
Observations 3,130 3,130 3,130 
Pseudo R-squared 0.081 0.077 0.076 
Significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels are denoted by ****, **, * respectively against the 
parameter estimate values. The Pseudo R-squared corresponds to McFadden‟s R-squared values. 
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Table 9: Robustness Checks 
The table reports the various robustness results for the relation between small world property and probability of 
acquisition for the sample of firms. The dependent variable is probability of acquisition given by acquire dummy 
which takes the value one if the firm has made an acquisition bid in the following year and zero otherwise. 
Columns1-2 gives the effect of average path length on probability of firm specific outcome with alternate set of 
controls. Column3 gives the effect of distance from randomness on probability of firm specific outcome. The 
distance from randomness is given by the absolute difference between node level clustering coefficient and density 
of the graph. Column4 gives the relation between spline specification of small world measure and probability of 
acquisition. Column5 gives the coefficients obtained by employing Firth‟s penalised maximum likelihood. The 
values in parenthesis give the standard errors clustered at individual firm level. The independent variables are a set 
of firm characteristic variables, group dummy, industry dummies and year dummies. For brevity we present the 
result for firm level small world measure only. 
 
 Column1 Column2 Column3 Column4 Column5 
Variables Alternate 
definition of 
controls 
Additional 
control 
Alternate 
definition of 
clustering 
Spline 
specification 
Firth‟s method 
Firm level small world 0.016** 0.019**   0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.008)   (0.007) 
Firm level small world* Firm 
level small world 
-0.000** -0.000**   -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Distance from randomness   1.427**   
   (0.627)   
Distance from randomness* 
Distance from randomness 
  -1.761***   
  (0.639)   
Spline1    0.010*  
    (0.005)  
Spline2    -0.255**  
    (0.119)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,130 2,862 3,130 3,130 3,130 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0758 0.0826 0.0852 0.0841 - 
Significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels are denoted by ****, **, * respectively against the 
parameter estimate values. The Pseudo R-squared corresponds to McFadden‟s R-squared values. 
 
